Running out of runway by Es, G.W.H. van
Unclassified 
Executive summary 
 
 
 
 
Unclassified 
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
  
Running out of runway 
Analysis of 35 years of landing overrun accidents  
 
  
 
Probleem area 
Landing overruns belong to the 
group of most frequently reported 
accident types in the world. 
Fortunately, landing overruns do 
not often result in causalities 
amongst passengers and crew. 
Despite this fact landing overruns 
can still be considered a major 
threat to aviation safety. It is 
therefore interesting to have an 
overview of factors that increase the 
landing overrun risk, the trends in 
statistics and in the influence of 
safety initiatives. A safety study on 
landing overruns of commercial 
transport aircraft was conducted 
which addressed these issues. 
 
Description 
This paper presents an analysis of 
landing overrun accidents of 
commercial transport aircraft that 
took place during the period 1970-
2004. A total of 400 accidents were 
identified and analysed. The 
accident data were obtained from 
the NLR Air Safety Database. A 
data taxonomy was developed 
based on factors that influence 
landing performance. The data were 
evaluated through a straightforward 
single-variable analysis. This 
included developing frequency 
distributions of each risk factor 
considered. It also included an 
exploratory analysis that provided a 
general understanding of the 
landing overrun accident data. A 
central objective of this study was 
to estimate the risk associated with 
the various landing factors (such as 
excess speed, tailwind, runway 
condition etc.). It was therefore 
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essential to understand the 
prevalence of these individual 
factors during landings which did 
not end up in a landing overrun. For 
instance to estimate the risk 
associated with long landings it 
should be known how many long 
landings took place without 
resulting in an overrun. The risk 
associated with the presence of a 
number of factors was estimated. 
Finally the data were analysed for 
trends. 
 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions are 
drawn  from the landing overrun 
accident data studied in this paper: 
 
• The Africa region demonstrated 
the highest landing overrun accident 
rate, followed by Central/South 
America, and Asia. All these 
regions had rates of more than one 
accident per million landings. The 
rest of the world demonstrated rates 
below one accident per two million 
landings which was less than half of 
the rate of the previous mentioned 
regions. North America had the 
lowest rate of all regions. 
 
• No statistically significant 
difference in the estimated landing 
overrun accident rate between 
commercial transport jet and 
turboprop aircraft was found. 
 
• On a worldwide basis, there 
appears to be a significant increase 
in landing overrun risk when one of 
the following factors is present 
during a landing: Non-precision 
approach, touching down far 
beyond the threshold (long landing), 
excess approach speed, visual 
approach, significant tailwind 
present, high on approach, 
wet/flooded runway, and/or 
snow/ice/slush covered runway. 
The highest risk increase occurred 
when the aircraft touched down far 
beyond the threshold (long landing), 
followed by excess approach speed.  
 
• On a worldwide basis, the 
landing overrun accident rate has 
reduced by a factor of three over a 
period of thirty-five years. This 
reduction is most likely the result of 
a number of factors including 
improvement in braking devices 
(antiskid, autobrakes etc.), better 
understanding of runway friction 
issues, and safety awareness 
campaigns.  
 
• Late or no application of 
available stopping devices was 
often found to be a factor in the 
landing overrun accident. These 
overrun accidents were all 
avoidable if the crew had used the 
available stopping devices, without 
any delay. 
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Summary 
Landing overruns belong to the group of most frequently reported accident types in the world. 
Fortunately, landing overruns do not often result in causalities amongst passengers and crew. 
Despite this fact landing overruns can still be considered a major threat to aviation safety. It is 
therefore interesting to have an overview of factors that increase the landing overrun risk, the 
trends in statistics and in the influence of safety initiatives. A safety study on landing overruns 
of commercial transport aircraft was conducted which addressed these issues.  
 
Landing overrun accidents of commercial transport aircraft that took place during the last 
35 years were analysed. A total of 400 accidents were identified and analysed. 
 
It was found that on a worldwide basis, there appears to be a significant increase in landing 
overrun risk when one of the following factors is present during a landing: Non-precision 
approach, touching down far beyond the threshold (long landing), excess approach speed, visual 
approach, significant tailwind present, high on approach, wet/flooded runway, and/or 
snow/ice/slush covered runway. The highest risk increase occurred when the aircraft touched 
down far beyond the threshold (long landing), followed by excess approach speed.  
Furthermore, it was found that on a worldwide basis, the landing overrun accident rate has 
reduced by a factor of three over a period of thirty-five years. This reduction is most likely the 
result of a numbers of factors including improvement in braking devices (antiskid, autobrakes 
etc.), better understanding of runway friction issues, and safety awareness campaigns.  
Late or no application of available stopping devices was often found to be a factor in the landing 
overrun accident. These overrun accidents were all avoidable if the crew had used the available 
stopping devices, without any delay. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
‘On February 28, 1984 the first officer flying a DC-10 was making a manual CAT II ILS 
approach to Runway 04R at New York JFK airport. The captain noted that the airspeed was 
high and informed the first officer. The approach bug speed was 168 knots. However when the 
aircraft crossed the threshold the speed was 204 knots. The aircraft touched down about 4,700 
ft. beyond the threshold of the 8,400 ft. runway and could not be stopped on the runway.  The 
captain steered the aircraft to the right to avoid an approach light pier as it overran and it 
came to rest on the waters of Thurston Basin some 600 ft. beyond the end of the runway. The 
accident happened on a wet runway.  The National Transport Safety Board NTSB determined 
that the probable cause of the accident was the crew's disregard for prescribed procedures for 
monitoring and controlling airspeed during the final stages of the approach, their decision to 
continue the landing rather than execute a missed approach and their over-reliance on the 
autothrottle speed control system, which had a history of recent malfunctions. The 163 
passengers and 14 crewmembers evacuated the aircraft safely, but a few received minor 
injuries. The nose and lower forward fuselage sections, wing engines, flaps, and leading edge 
devices were substantially damaged at impact. (source: NTSB accident investigation report 
AAR-84/15).’ This is a typical example of an accident in which the pilot was not able to stop the 
aircraft before the end of the runway. This is event is called an ‘overrun’. Overruns can occur 
during both takeoffs and landings. However the vast majority took place during landing. 
Takeoff overruns normally occur after high-speed rejected takeoffs. Although rejected takeoffs 
are not uncommon the majority happen at relatively low speeds explaining the lower number of 
takeoff overruns. Most aircraft land on runways that are longer than the minimum required 
distance. Still each year landing overruns are reported worldwide. Landing overruns belong to 
the group of most frequently reported accident types in the world. Fortunately, landing overruns 
do not often result in causalities amongst passengers and crew. The landing overrun accident 
with an Airbus A340 that occurred recently at Toronto - Lester B. Pearson International airport 
clearly illustrates this. Despite this fact landing overruns can still be considered a major threat to 
aviation safety. It is therefore interesting to have an overview of factors that increase the landing 
overrun risk, the trends in statistics and in the influence of safety initiatives. This paper presents 
a safety study on landing overruns of commercial transport aircraft. For this purpose landing 
overrun accidents that took place during the last 35 years were analysed. 
 
1.2 Objective and scope 
The objectives of the study are to identify and quantify the most important risk factors 
associated with landing overruns; to see if there are any trends in landing overruns during the 
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last 35 years of flying; and to try to see what influence safety initiatives possibly have had on 
landing overruns. This study was limited to commercial transport aircraft. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the paper 
Section 2 of this paper presents an overview of the factors that influence the landing 
performance. Section 3 discusses the methodology applied in this study. The findings are 
presented in section 4 and are discussed in section 5. Section 6 gives some final remarks. The 
conclusions and recommendations are presented in section 7. 
 
 
2 Factors influencing landing performance 
There are a number of factors that influence the landing performance. For the present study it is 
important to have a basic understanding of these factors without going into much detail. This 
section presents a brief overview of those landing performance factors 
 
2.1 What is a ‘good’ landing? 
In short a ‘good’ landing has the following characteristics. It starts with a stabilised approach on 
speed, in trim and on glide path.  During the approach the aircraft is positioned to land in the 
touchdown zone. When the aircraft crosses the threshold it is at the correct height and speed. 
The approach is ended by a flare without any rapid control column movements which is 
followed by a positive touchdown without floating. Immediately after touchdown of the main 
gear the spoilers (if available) are raised (manually or automatically), the brakes are applied 
(manually or automatically), (if available) the reverse thrust or propeller reverse is selected and 
the nose is lowered. These actions are all conducted without delay and according to the standard 
operating procedures. This is the landing as it can be found in flight crew training manuals. 
However, not many landings are conducted exactly like this every day. Deviations from this 
good practice occur often without any serious consequences. However, when there are large 
deviations from the ‘good’ practice it can become more difficult to stop the aircraft on the 
runway. These deviations are discussed in the next sections. 
 
A good landing is one that you can walk away from. 
A great landing is one where you can use the aircraft again. 
 
2.2 Approach speed 
The approach speed is determined by a number of factors such as flap setting, weight of the 
aircraft, the headwind, turbulence, and the handling of the pilots. Based on a number of these 
factors the pilot calculates a target approach speed (bug speed) which the pilot tries to fly during 
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the approach. In the example presented in the introduction of this paper, the DC10 was flying 
36 kts too fast when crossing the threshold. Excess approach speed increases the tendency that 
the aircraft floats during the flare. Some aircraft have a higher tendency to float than others. 
This is mainly affected by the aerodynamic ground effect which varies amongst different 
aircraft types. In case of floating the pilot often tries to bleed off the excess speed. This action 
takes a significant part of the amount of runway remaining to stop the aircraft. The effect of the 
excess speed on the ground roll distance is usually less than the increase of the flare distance 
due to floating. This is explained by the fact that the declaration of the aircraft during the flare is 
only a fraction of what can be achieved during braking on the ground even on slippery runways. 
Therefore putting down the aircraft with an excess in speed is important instead of bleeding off 
the excess speed in the air. Excess approach speed landings are more often associated with non-
precision and visual approaches than with precision approaches. Precision approaches are 
inherently related with a procedure in which a constant descent gradient from the final approach 
altitude to touchdown is defined. The descent gradient can be verified during the flight. Non-
precision approaches can be designed to be a stabilised approach procedure. However this is not 
always the case which makes such approaches more vulnerable to excess speed. 
 
2.3 Approach path 
Atmospheric turbulence, guidance errors and inaccurate control by the pilot can result in 
deviations from the nominal glide path. It is important that the aircraft crosses the threshold at 
the correct height and with the intended glideslope. Excess height at the threshold can increase 
the landing distance. The same applies when the glideslope is shallower. For example the 
increase in landing distance for an aircraft on a 3 degree glideslope approach with excess height 
of 30 ft. at the threshold is approximately 700 ft. In combination with a one degree shallower 
glideslope this increases to approximately 1,000 ft. Some pilots tend to make a so-called duck 
under manoeuvre when crossing the runway threshold. In this situation the pilot is flying the 
aircraft below the nominal path with a shallower glideslope. The tendency to do so varies 
amongst the pilots, aircraft type flown and visual conditions. Such a flying technique can also 
result in longer landings.  
 
Excess height landings are more often associated with non-precision and visual approaches than 
with precision approaches. Precision approaches are inherently related with a procedure in 
which a constant descent gradient from the final approach altitude to touchdown is defined. This 
descent gradient can be verified during the flight. Non-precision approaches can be designed to 
be a stabilised approach procedure. However this is not always the case which makes such 
approaches more vulnerable to excess height.   
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2.4 Flare and touchdown 
During the flare manoeuvre the pilot reduces the rate of descent so that an excessively hard 
touchdown is avoided. In the execution of the flare the pilot relies on his/her experience and 
judgement. The pilot decides on the moment to initiate the flare and on the amount of elevator 
input during the flare. The touchdown should follow immediately upon the completion of the 
flare. However, often the aircraft floats for some time before touchdown. This can take a 
considerable amount of runway. In the example presented in the introduction of this paper, the 
DC10 landed some 4,700 ft. beyond the threshold. In the example the aircraft floated for some 
distance after the initial landing flare. The 20ft. callout was made three times. Thereafter, the 
captain (PNF) told the First Officer (PF) to put the aircraft down. The tendency to float depends 
on a number of factors which are difficult to generalise. For instance, ground effect appears to 
play an important role.  Ground effect is the aerodynamic influence of the ground on the flow 
around an aircraft. It increases the lift, reduces the aerodynamic drag, and generates a nose 
down pitching moment as the ground is approached. The nature of and magnitude of ground 
effect are strongly affected by the aircraft configuration. Ground effect provides a landing 
cushion that feels very comfortable to the pilot. This could explain to some extent the influence 
of ground effect on the tendency to float. As explained already excess approach speed can also 
result in floating of the aircraft after the flare as the pilot tries to bleed off the excess speed. 
 
The touchdown should be done positive without being excessively hard. When the touchdown is 
too smooth spin up of the tires could be delayed when the runway is slippery. As explained later 
this can affect the deployment of ground spoilers and the proper functioning of the antiskid 
system. 
 
After touchdown of the main wheels the nose should be lowered without delay in order to 
maximise the load on the tires. On some fighter jets the pilots tend to keep the nose up as long 
as possible in order to increase drag and shorten the needed runway length. This technique is 
called ‘aerodynamic braking’ and is an acceptable technique on some fighter jets. However for 
commercial transport aircraft it is not a recommended technique. The stopping forces associated 
with this technique are only a fraction of those forces when the aircraft is braked with the nose 
down. The ‘aerodynamic braking’ technique has resulted in landing overruns with commercial 
transport jets in the past. Therefore it should never be used during landings with commercial 
transport aircraft. 
 
2.5 Rollout 
The prompt use of all available stopping systems helps to minimise the rollout distance. As soon 
as the aircraft has touched down these devices should be utilised without any delay. There are a 
number of stopping devices used: ground spoilers, reverse thrust, and tire brakes. Ground 
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spoilers are installed on a large number of commercial transport aircraft. In particular jet 
transport aircraft are equipped with ground spoilers. Reverse thrust is available on a number of 
jet and propeller aircraft. This device provides effective means of stopping the aircraft. Tire 
brakes are the stopping device that every aircraft has installed. Another stopping force that 
comes for free during the ground roll with any aircraft is the airframe aerodynamic drag. 
Problems with the stopping devices and or any delay in using them can make it difficult for the 
pilot to stop the aircraft on the runway. Some of the issues with the mentioned stopping devices 
will be briefly discussed next. 
 
Tire braking is one of the primary means of generating stopping forces on an aircraft. The tire 
has to slip to generate a braking force. Maximum braking force is achieved at a tire slip in the 
order of 10-15%. The braking force on a tire is proportional with the vertical load on the tire. 
Runway conditions also influence the amount of braking force a tire can generate. The highest 
braking forces are obtained on dry surfaces. Whenever the runway is wet, flooded or covered 
with snow, ice or slush, lower braking forces are obtained than on a dry runway. In case of wet 
runways the texture of the surface is also important. On a wet, rough surface higher braking 
forces are achievable than on a wet, smooth surface. Most commercial transport aircraft are 
equipped with an antiskid system. This system prevents tires from lockups and automatically 
optimises tire slip for maximum braking forces by controlling the braking pressure. The pilot 
can therefore apply maximum brake pedal input without being concerned of possible tire 
lockups and optimum braking. The antiskid needs a reference wheel speed to function. This 
speed is initially generated by the wheel itself just after touchdown.  However wheel spin-up 
can be delayed when landing on flooded runways. On such runways the aircraft tires can 
hydroplane. The footprint of the tire is then separated from the surface by a film of water. 
Frictional forces between the tire and the ground are then very low as water cannot develop 
significant friction forces. Friction forces are needed to get the tire spinning. The speed at which 
a tire starts to hydroplane depends on a number of factors such as tire inflation pressure, forward 
speed of the tire, tire design (radial or cross-ply), etc (see Van Es, 2001 for more information on 
hydroplaning). The tires can become locked if the pilot applies braking before the tires are 
spinning. As a result the braking forces are significantly lower.  
 
Jet transports can be equipped with an automatic braking system. The autobrake system was 
introduced in the early and mid seventies. The autobrake system automatically controls the 
braking of the aircraft after touchdown. An autobrake selector switch allows the pilot to select 
from several deceleration levels for landing. During the landing roll pressure is automatically 
applied to the brakes after touchdown. The system regulates brake pressure to compensate for 
the effects of aircraft drag, thrust reversers, and spoilers to maintain the selected deceleration 
level. The autobrakes system disarms immediately when the pilot applies manual braking. The 
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autobrake system is a very efficient system which is not always recognised as such by the pilots. 
Compared to manual braking the deceleration generated by the autobrake system is usually 
more consistent. Furthermore pilots tend to limit their brake input. In case of the need to stop 
the aircraft when only limited runway is available this behaviour can be critical. Flight 
simulators do a great job in simulating the flight characteristics of an aircraft. However they are 
not good in simulating ground forces. The sensation of a truly maximum braking effort cannot 
be simulated correctly. The noises, the vibrations, the deceleration associated with a maximum 
braking effort are not similar to the real situation. Therefore simulator training to familiarise 
pilots with the maximum manual braking situation is in general not fully effective. So whenever 
the pilot applies maximum manual braking, the pilot’s reaction will often be to reduce the brake 
pedal input. The use of autobrakes for landing on slippery runways instead of manual braking 
has been recommended in the past by accident investigation agencies. For instance the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and FAA gave the following recommendation after 
examining the MD82 overrun accident at Little Rock (June 1999): “Autobrake systems, when 
available and operative, should be armed and confirmed armed by both pilots, in accordance 
with manufacturers’ recommended procedures for the airplane and autobrake system regarding 
landing on a wet or slippery runway, or landing in a high crosswind, or in accordance with 
equivalent approved company procedures.  Those procedures should be reflected in the 
respective flight manual, checklists, and training program used by the pilot, or when 
recommended procedures are not specified by the applicable manufacturers regarding landing 
on a wet or slippery runway, or landing in a high crosswind, autobrake systems, when available 
and operative, should be armed and confirmed armed by both pilots when preparing to land in 
any of those conditions.  Those procedures should be reflected in the respective flight manual, 
checklist, and training program used by the pilot.” 
 
Ground spoilers (also known as lift dumpers) are located on the top of the wing. When deployed 
they increase the aerodynamic drag. They also decrease the aerodynamic lift significantly, 
resulting in a higher load on the tires. Ground spoilers are most effective at high speeds. Aircraft 
can be equipped with wing mounted ground spoilers that can raise automatically right after 
main gear touchdown. For this the ground spoilers need to be armed prior to touchdown. 
Ground contact sensors are installed on the aircraft in order to prevent ground spoilers to deploy 
automatically in the air. There are different types of contact sensors in use. Wheel spin-up of the 
main gear tires can be used as an indication of ground contact. Main landing gear oleo 
compression can also be used (often in combination with wheel spin-up). On aircraft equipped 
with bogie main landing gears, the tilt angle of can be used as an indication of ground contact. 
As discussed earlier in this section wheel spin-up can be delayed when landing on flooded 
runways. As the friction force on a tire is proportional with the load on the tire it is important to 
get as much load on the tires right after touchdown. Ground spoilers are designed to do just that. 
  
-13- 
NLR-TP-2005-498 
 
  
 
 
However if the ground spoilers are waiting for the tires to spin-up a major problem has raised. 
The ground spoilers need then to be deployed manually. On many aircraft the ground spoilers 
can also deploy upon activation of thrust reversers. For this the spoilers do not need to be armed 
before touchdown. However, it is always better to arm the ground spoilers before touchdown in 
the event of inoperative reversers or no use of the reversers. It can also take some time to select 
the reversers which delays the deployment of the spoilers. 
 
Thrust reversers are stopping devices which do not depend on runway condition. They are very 
effective in generating stopping forces especially on slippery runways. Thrust reversers on jet 
transports generate the highest stopping forces at high speeds. Below a certain speed maximum 
reverse thrust is often not allowed. The reverse thrust is modulated to idle reverse between 80-
60 knots IAS on a jet transport in order to avoid foreign objected damage to the engine and to 
avoid the ingestion of turbulent air from the reverse thrust into the main engine inlet, possibly 
leading to an engine surge or stall. On turboprop aircraft the propellers are normally moved out 
of reverse at lower speeds than on jet transports. On some turboprop aircraft full reverse cannot 
be selected at high speeds due to the possibility of asymmetrical reserve thrust. Another issue is 
that the reversers on jet transports can produce a lot of noise. This sometimes restricts their use 
on airports to idle thrust only. If thrust reversers are available and the conditions are marginal 
(e.g. wet/contaminated runway, wind conditions, short runway etc.) they should always be used 
regardless of environmental restrictions. Thrust reversers can also give directional 
controllability problems in some cases. For instance, tail mounted engine can affect the flow 
around the vertical tail reducing rudder effectiveness. Also the use of thrust reversers in heavy 
crosswind conditions can give controllability problems. These controllability problems can be 
solved by reducing the reverse thrust. However, the pilot then looses a valuable stopping force. 
 
2.6 Automatic versus manual landing 
Aircraft that can land during low visibility and/or cloud ceilings (CAT III conditions) are 
equipped with a system that allows the aircraft to make a fully automatic landing. The majority 
of aircraft that have these systems installed can only conduct a fully automatic landing up to 
touchdown (autoland with no roll-out guidance). After touchdown the crew must disengage the 
autopilot and take control of the aircraft. Although the autoland system is very accurate, it is not 
able to the get the aircraft to touchdown on the exact same spot on the runway every time. 
However compared to manual instrument landings the touchdown scatter of an automatic 
landing is much less. Unpublished flight data showed that the mean distance from the threshold 
to the touchdown point is about 30% higher during a manual instrument landing. The scatter in 
this distance (in terms of standard deviation) is about 130% higher during a manual landing. 
These facts are not a big surprise as the manual instrument landing is strongly influenced by 
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pilot flight handling. Touching down far on the runway, flying fast and/or flying high above the 
flight path are things that are less likely to occur during automatic landings.  
 
Normally autolands are conducted when the visibility condition or cloud ceiling is too low to 
make a safe manual landing.  However this does not rule out the use of autoland systems during 
better weather conditions. Indeed autolands are conducted during fine weather conditions with 
excellent visibility (although not many). Full protection of the ILS is not required for that case. 
It is also expected that the crew will have sufficient visual references to detect and correct any 
deviations from the expected flight path. However there are some risks of performing autoland 
operations on runways not meeting CAT II/III standards. Protection of the ILS sensitive area is 
not assured, and other aircraft and vehicles may cause disturbance to the localiser signal. 
Unexpected flight control movements may occur at a very low altitude when the autopilot 
attempts to follow the disturbed beam bends. The crews should therefore be alert to the 
possibility of abnormal autopilot behaviour and guard the flight controls throughout the 
automatic landing. The crew should also be prepared to disconnect the autopilot and manually 
land or go-around. However during significant crosswind landings disconnecting the autopilot 
at low altitudes can be risky. The operator should always include the appropriate instructions in 
the flight operations manual for autoland landings under good visibility conditions. The crew 
should also inform ATC about the intention to conduct an autoland under the above mentioned 
scenario. In that case ATC can inform the flight crew of any known or anticipated disturbance 
of the ILS beam due to other aircraft and vehicles.  
 
On February 21, 1986 a DC9 landed on runway 24 of Erie international airport. The aircraft 
touched down some 2,000ft beyond the displaced threshold. Although the pilots armed the 
spoilers they did not automatically deploy so that the captain armed them manually. Reverse 
thrust was selected and the brakes activated. The brakes were not effective. Subsequently the 
aircraft could not be brought to a halt before the end of the runway. The aircraft overran 
through a fence eventually coming to rest partly across a road.  The runway was covered in 
snow with a reported braking action of fair-to-poor.  The approach was flown with a tail wind 
and approximately 10kt above reference speed.  Tailwind landings on Runway 24 were not 
authorised in wet or slippery conditions. Source: NTSB report DCA86AA018 
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3 Data analysis methodology 
3.1 Approach 
The overall data analysis approach employed in this study was to: 
 
• Develop a taxonomy for the collation and analysis of the data; 
• Identify a sample of landing overrun accidents; and, 
• Analyse the data to determine what factors and to what degree they were associated with 
landing overrun accidents. 
 
3.2 Data inclusion criteria 
The following criteria were used to establish the data sample: 
 
• Only occurrences that were classified as ‘accidents’ according to ICAO Annex 13 
definition were included.  
 
• Both fatal and non-fatal accidents were included. 
 
• The accidents involved a landing overrun. An overrun is an event in which the aircraft 
departed the end of the runway. Also included are those events where the pilots noticed 
that the aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining runway and decided to deliberately 
steer the aircraft off the runway to avoid a collision with objects placed near the runway 
end. Not included are those events in which the pilots lost directional control of the aircraft 
on the ground resulting in a veer-off. 
 
• Accidents related to unlawful or military action were excluded. 
 
• The accidents involved fixed wing aircraft with a maximum takeoff mass of 5,500kg or 
higher that were used in a commercial operation (passenger or cargo) excluding training 
and ferry flights. There was no restriction to the geographical location. 
 
• The accidents occurred during 1970 through 2004. 
 
3.3 Data sources 
The primary data source used in this study was the NLR Air Safety database. For many years 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR maintains a large database with aviation safety related data 
called the NLR Air Safety Database. The NLR Air Safety Database is a collection of databases 
containing different types of data. The NLR Air Safety Database contains detailed information 
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on accidents and incidents of fixed wing aircraft from 1960 and onwards. Currently the NLR 
Air Safety Database contains detailed information on more than 40,000 accidents and serious 
incidents that occurred world-wide. For each occurrence a wide variety of factual information is 
available. For a large number of occurrences the causal and contributing factors are also 
available. Besides data on accidents and incidents the NLR Air Safety Database also contains a 
large collection of non-accident related data. These data include the following: airport data, 
flight exposure data (hours & flights at the level of airlines, aircraft type, and airports), weather 
data, fleet data, and more. The NLR Air Safety Database is updated frequently using reliable 
sources including data from official reporting systems, insurance claims, accident investigation 
boards, aircraft manufacturers, civil aviation authorities and more. Queries were conducted in 
the NLR Air Safety Database using the data inclusion criteria. The level of detail of the 
information available for each individual accident varied. For a large number of accidents 
detailed reports were available. However for some accidents there was only limited information.  
 
3.4 Taxonomy 
The accident data were analysed using a taxonomy that was developed for this study. The 
taxonomy was based on the factors that influence landing performance as discussed in section 2 
extended with some additional elements such as aircraft type and location. The taxonomy is 
listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy. 
Aircraft type 
Approach type (precision, non-precision, visual) 
Autoland 
Date 
Excess approach speed 
Failure of stopping device 
High on approach 
Hydroplaning of the tires 
Late or no application of available stopping devices (reversers, brakes, spoilers) 
Location 
Long landing (touching down far beyond the threshold) 
Propulsion type 
Runway condition (dry, wet, flooded, icy, snow covered) 
Tailwind  
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3.5 Analytical process employed 
The major steps included in the analysis of the study are listed below: 
 
1. The data were evaluated through a straightforward single-variable analysis. This included 
developing frequency distributions of each risk factor considered. It also included an 
exploratory analysis that provided a general understanding of the landing overrun accident 
data. 
 
2. A central objective of this study was to estimate the risk associated with the various 
landing factors (excess speed, tailwind, runway condition etc.). It was therefore essential to 
understand the prevalence of these individual factors during landings which did not end up 
in a landing overrun. For instance to estimate the risk associated with long landings it 
should be known how many long landings took place without resulting in an overrun. 
These data were obtained in various ways. First of all the NLR Air Safety Database 
contains data which allows making fairly accurate estimations of the prevalence of a 
number of risk factors in non-accident landings. Examples are the number of landings 
conducted on the different runway surface conditions. For other risk factors data obtained 
from Flight Data Monitoring systems from a limited number of operators were used. These 
data were used to estimate prevalence of a number of risk factors in non-accident landings. 
Examples are excess approach speed, long landings, and high approaches. It is realised that 
this only gives a rough order of magnitude of the prevalence of those risk factors for 
operations worldwide. This should be considered when analysing the results. An estimate 
of the risk of having a landing overrun accident with a particular risk factor present was 
accomplished by calculating a risk ratio. This risk ratio provides insight on the association 
of a factor on the risk in a landing overrun accident. The risk ratio is the rate of the accident 
probability with the factor present over the accident probability without the factor present. 
The risk ratio is given by the following formula: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
factorrisk  a of presence without landings normal
factor risk  a of presence without accidents
factorrisk  a of presence with landings normal
factor risk  a of presence with accidents
RatioRisk  
 
Risk ratio values greater than 1 indicate an increase level of risk due to the presence of a 
particular factor. A risk ratio of 4 means that the probability of accident with the risk factor 
present is 4 time higher than without its presence. Positive associations between a risk 
factor and landing overruns accidents show that a demonstrated association exists. 
However it does not prove causation.  
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3. Finally trends in the accident data were analysed. In particular changes over time were 
considered. 
 
 
4 Findings 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
A total of 400 landing overrun accidents were found that met the data inclusion criteria. During 
the study period (1970-2004) it was estimated that approximately 796 million landings were 
conducted worldwide with passenger and cargo aircraft with a takeoff mass of 5,500kg or 
higher. The estimated landing overrun accident rate for the study period was 0.5 per million 
landings worldwide. Table 2 presents the accident distribution by region. The landing accident 
overrun rate per million landings is also given. Table 2 clearly shows the differences in landing 
overrun rates between the world regions.  
 
Table 2: Aircraft accident distribution by region 
Region Landings millions Accidents 
Rate 
per million landings 
Africa 31.84 86 2.70 
Asia 71.64 74 1.03 
Australasia 31.84 8 0.25 
Central/South America 55.72 75 1.35 
Europe 191.04 91 0.48 
North America 397.99 61 0.15 
Middle East 15.92 5 0.31 
All 795.99 400 0.50 
 
The distribution of accidents by aircraft category is shown in Table 3. The difference in landing 
accident overrun rate between jets and turboprop aircraft was not statistically significant at the 
5% level. This means that the probability of a landing overrun accident of a jet aircraft is not 
different from a turboprop aircraft. 
 
Table 3: Landing overrun accident distribution by aircraft category. 
Aircraft type Landings millions Accidents 
Rate 
per million landings 
Transport jet 527.22 250 0.47 
Transport turboprop 268.76 150 0.56 
 
Table 4 shows the distributions of the landing overrun risk factors for the complete data sample. 
The values shown in Table 4 are raw values only. They are not corrected for the number of 
landings conducted which is done in the next section of the paper.  
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Table 4: Landing overrun risk factors distribution. 
Factor Number of accidents Percent 
Non-precision approach 289 72.3% 
Long landing 211 52.8% 
Excess approach speed 111 27.8% 
Hydroplaning of the tires 60 15.0% 
Late or no application of available stopping devices 60 15.0% 
Visual approach 56 14.0% 
Tailwind present 49 12.3% 
High on approach 29 7.3% 
Brakes inoperative 21 5.3% 
Reverser inoperative 10 2.5% 
Ground spoilers inoperative 2 0.5% 
 
The different types of runway surface conditions in the landing overrun accidents are shown in 
Figure 1. Often the surface condition varied along the runway. For instance part of the runway 
can be icy and another part covered with snow. Also in the case of flooded runways it was often 
only a part of the runway that had pools of standing water with the remaining part of the runway 
being wet. For this reason the different surface conditions that can exist are grouped in Figure 1. 
The values shown in Figure 1 are raw values only. They are not corrected for the number of 
landings conducted on under such runway conditions which is done in the next section of the 
paper. 
 
Wet/Flooded 
47.8%
Dry
46.8%
Ice/Snow/Slush
5.5%
 
Figure 1: Runway condition distribution. 
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4.2 Bivariate analysis 
In order to estimate risk ratios as defined in section 3.5, the number of landings with or without 
a factor absent should be known. Different approaches were followed to obtain these data. For 
instance, data from airline flight data monitoring programs were used to estimate the number of 
long, fast and high landings for the complete data set. The approach type flown was estimated 
from the NLR Air Safety Database which contains information regarding precision, non-
precision and visual approaches by airport (see also Khatwa et. al., 1996). The actual runway 
conditions at airports (e.g. wet, snow covered etc.) are not well recorded in databases. Therefore 
the number of landings conducted on the different runway conditions were estimated from 
historical hourly precipitation observations at airports. The fact that it, for instance, rains does 
not automatically mean that the runway is wet. This depends on the drainage characteristics of 
the runway, the wind, the amount of rain that is falling and some other factors. With a 
precipitation like snow the runway can be made clear of it when large amounts accumulate on 
the surface. Therefore adjustments were made on the calculated number of landings on 
wet/contaminated runways based on hourly precipitation observations. These adjustments were 
done by using engineering judgement. Although it is realised that this approach can introduce 
errors in the results it is believed that the errors are small enough just to fulfil the basic 
objectives of this study. 
 
The calculation of risk ratios could not be accomplished for all variables that were considered. 
Denominator data for the late or no use of stopping devices and the failure of stopping devices 
were not available. There were data available on the failure of stopping devices for a number of 
countries with a high safety standard. However it was felt that these data were not applicable to 
the overall sample. 
 
Table 5 presents the association of landing overrun related risk factors, adjusted for the number 
of landings involved in each factor. A value greater than 1 indicates a greater risk. The larger 
the risk ratio value the stronger the association between the factor and the landing overrun 
accident risk. All risk ratios presented in Table 5 are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
landing overrun accident risk while flying a non-precision approach was twenty-five times 
greater than that associated with precision approach. The risk ratio was twenty-seven when 
flying a visual approach compared to a precision approach. If the landing was long, the landing 
overrun accident risk was fifty-five times greater than when it was not long. The landing 
overrun risk is thirty-eight times greater when there was excess approach speed. A tailwind of 5 
knots or more increases the landing overrun risk by a factor of five times. Finally being high on 
approach increases the risk with factor of twenty-six. The results presented in Table 5 treat the 
long landing (touching down far beyond the threshold), excess approach speed, high approach 
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and approach type variables as independent. However, in some cases these variables were 
related. For instance high and fast landings often resulted in long landings. 
 
Table 6 shows the risk ratios associated with runway condition. All risk ratios presented in 
Table 6 are statistically significant at the 5% level. The landing overrun accident risk increases 
with factor of ten when the landing was conducted on a wet or flooded runway. If the runway 
was covered with snow, ice or slush the landing overrun accident risk is fourteen times greater 
than when landing on a dry surface. 
 
Table 5: Risk ratio for landing overrun related risk factors 
Landing overrun related 
risk factor Risk Ratio 
Risk-factor 
accidents 
Risk-factor 
absent 
accidents 
Risk factor 
landings 
million 
Risk factor 
absent landings 
million 
Non-precision approach* 25 289 55 135.32 636.79 
Long landing 55 211 189 15.92 780.07 
Excess approach speed 38 111 289 7.96 788.03 
Visual approach* 27 56 55 23.88 636.79 
Significant tailwind present 5 49 351 23.88 772.11 
High on approach 26 29 371 2.35 793.63 
*Compared to a precision approach. 
 
Table 6: Risk ratio for runway surface conditions. 
Runway condition Risk Ratio 
Risk-factor 
accidents 
Risk-factor 
absent 
accidents* 
Risk factor 
landings 
million 
Risk factor 
absent landings* 
million 
wet/flooded 10 191 187 73.71 716.42 
snow/icy/slush 14 22 187 5.86 716.42 
* Dry runway condition 
 
4.3 Trend analysis 
Figure 2 shows the variation in the landing overrun accident rate for the period 1970 through 
2004. The data were grouped in 5-year blocks in order to increase the statistical robustness of 
the data. Figure 3 shows the share of landing overrun accidents in the overall number of 
approach and landing accidents that occurred worldwide. Again the data were grouped in 5-year 
blocks.  
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Figure 2: Landing overrun accident rate trend. 
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Figure 3: Trend in share of landing overrun accidents in approach & landing accidents. 
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5 Discussion 
In this study 400 landing overrun accidents were analysed that occurred worldwide in the period 
1970-2004. Based on the findings of the analysis of these accidents a discussion of the results is 
presented in this section. 
 
5.1 Aircraft accident distribution by region 
It was found that the landing overrun risk varies for the different world regions (see Table 2). 
There are several explanations for this finding. There exists a difference in the level of aviation 
safety between the different regions in general. This could also affect the landing overrun risk. 
Note that an almost similar regional distribution in accident rates was found for landing 
accidents in general, e.g. not limited to overruns (see Khatwa et. al., 1996).  
 
The highest landing overrun rate was found for Africa. The lowest rate was for North America. 
However when comparing the rates for the different regions it should be realised that not all 
differences in accident rates are statistically significant (at the 5% level). Although North 
America seems to have the lowest rate it was not found to be statistically different from the rates 
estimated for the Middle East and Australasia regions. The low rate for North America was 
statistically different from the rate for the Europe and remaining regions. 
 
5.2 Long, fast and high landings 
In more than half of all accidents the landing was long meaning that the aircraft contacted the 
runway far beyond the threshold. Landing far beyond the threshold showed the highest landing 
overrun risk increase. A long landing itself is not always hazardous. For instance, when a small 
turboprop aircraft lands on a very long runway, landing long will not automatically result in 
difficulties stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. However, long landings can become 
more hazardous when the available runway to stop the aircraft becomes shorter and/or the 
runway is slippery. The estimated number of long landings used to derive the risk ratio, 
contained landings on all kinds of runways with different lengths. In that respect the derived 
risk ratio for long landings represents an average risk value. Landing fast and/or high also 
increased the landing overrun risk significantly. Long landings are often associated with fast, 
high landings and/or tailwind landings. Excess approach speed is often a reason for a pilot to 
float the aircraft after the landing flare during which the pilot tries to get rid of the excess speed. 
Excess approach speed was mentioned in 37.4% (79 out of 211) of all long landings. Being high 
on approach can also lead to longer landings. High on approach was mentioned in 12.8% (27 
out of 211) of all long landings. In only 2 high approach cases there was no long landing 
reported. Pilots clearly need to follow their procedures for monitoring and controlling airspeed 
and height during the final stages of the approach. Tailwind can also increase the tendency to 
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float. A tailwind condition existed in 15.2% (32 out of 211) of all long landings. Long landing 
cannot be explained by excess speed, high approaches etc. only. Clearly pilot flying technique 
plays a significant role in the occurrence of a long landing. More study is required to get a better 
understanding of this. 
 
5.3 Approach type 
The landing overrun risk is much higher when a non-precision or visual approach is flown. 
These approach types are more likely to become unstabilised (e.g. flying too fast and too high) 
than precision approaches. Indeed the vast majority of overruns in which there was an excess 
approach speed occurred during a non-precision or visual approach (81%). In 80% of all landing 
overrun accidents that were high over the threshold the approach type was non-precision or 
visual. Similar in 82% of all overruns in which a long landing was reported the approach type 
was a non-precision or visual approach. 
 
5.4 Runway condition 
Slippery runway conditions were associated with higher risk of a landing overrun accident (see 
Table 6). This finding is not a surprise and is well known in the aviation community. However 
the quantitative increase in risk was not known. Runway condition affects the braking forces the 
aircraft tires can generate. Furthermore wheel spin-up can be delayed on slippery runways, 
which affects the proper functioning of the antiskid system and the deployment of ground 
spoilers. On wet/flooded or slush covered runways the tire may hydroplane which reduces the 
braking forces between the tire and runway significantly. On snow and ice covered runways the 
braking friction levels are very low making it difficult to stop the aircraft. During the last 35 
years there have been many initiatives to get a better understanding into runway traction. 
Numerous studies have been conducted for instance in the United States by NASA, USAF and 
FAA and in the United Kingdom to understand the impact of runway condition on the stopping 
capabilities of an aircraft. These studies examined the influence of runway texture on braking 
friction, analysed the hydroplaning of tires, and showed what impact snow and ice had on 
braking friction. Several studies also looked at measuring runway friction using ground vehicles 
and the correlation of the outcome of these vehicles with the friction of an aircraft. Such 
correlations could be valuable for the pilot when making an assessment of the landing 
performance. Unfortunately, despite the great effort made so far, an acceptable solution to this 
problem of measuring runway friction and correlating it to aircraft landing performance is still 
to be found. 
 
5.5 Tailwind landings 
Tailwind landing are associated with higher risk of landing overruns (see Table 5). Tailwind 
increases the ground speed and therefore the landing distance (see Van Es & Karwal, 2001). 
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Typically aircraft are certified to make landings with a maximum tailwind component. For most 
commercial aircraft this is 10 knots on a dry runway. Some aircraft are certified for higher 
tailwinds. However, this is usually not more than 15 knots. On slippery runways lower tailwinds 
are allowed during the landing varying from 5 knots to no tailwind at all. A more detailed 
discussion on tailwind operations is provided by Van Es & Karwal, 2001. 
 
5.6 Application of available stopping devices 
In 8.3% of the landing overrun accidents one or more stopping devices did not function (see 
Table 4). This was mainly due to problems with the hydraulic systems. This sometimes also 
prevented the use of flaps which resulted automatically in excess approach speed landings. 
More worrying is the fact the in 15% of the accidents there was a late or no application of the 
available stopping devices (see Table 4). In many of these accidents an overrun was avoidable if 
the available stopping devices would have been properly used. The problems were mainly 
caused by the fact that the ground spoilers were not armed (52% of all cases with a late or no 
application of the available stopping device). In these cases the pilots often failed to notice that 
the spoilers did not deploy. Also late or no application of thrust reversers was often found in the 
accidents (67% of all cases with a late or no application of the available stopping device). In 
some cases reverse thrust was selected initially. However shortly afterwards it was deselected 
again. It could be not derived from the analysed data that insufficient manual braking was often 
a factor. However, to identify that fact detailed flight data recordings need to be analysed. 
Unfortunately, in many of the analysed accidents such information was not available to the 
present author. 
 
5.7 Autolands 
None of the analysed landing overrun accidents was reported to be attributable to 
malfunctioning or improper functioning of the autoland system. In one accident from the data 
sample the crew initially conducted an autoland, however, took manual control over the aircraft 
again just after passing the threshold. In only a very few number of other cases it was suspected 
that an autoland was most likely conducted due to the visibility conditions at the time of 
landing. However, not enough details were reported to be absolutely sure about these facts. This 
made it difficult to estimate a reliable risk ratio for manual landings. Still it can be argued that 
autolands can reduce the landing overrun probability as it reduces the likelihood of flying too 
high, too fast, and making long landings. As shown in this study these factors increase the risk 
of a landing overrun accident. 
 
5.8 Trend analysis 
Figure 2 shows the trend in the landing overrun accident rate worldwide. It is shown that in the 
seventies the rate was the highest for the period considered in this study (1970-2004). During 
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the eighties the rate significantly improved. However this improvement did not continue in 
nineties. The first five years of the twenty first century finally showed a reduction in the landing 
overrun accident rate again. It is difficult to say what exactly caused the reduction in the 
accident rate during the period 1970-2004. However there are a number of initiatives that could 
have contributed to the safety improvement. Some of the more important ones will be discussed 
now.  
 
The efficiency of the antiskid systems has improved significantly over the years. The early 
antiskid systems were simple on-off systems that produced braking efficiencies of 60% and 
were introduced in the fifties. Later (sixties) modulated antiskid systems were introduced that 
had braking efficiencies in the 70-85% range. During the seventies braking efficiencies of 
consistently over 90% were achieved for the first time with the newer antiskid systems. The 
commercial aircraft that were operated in the analysed period in this study were equipped with 
one of the antiskid systems described here. As time progresses older aircraft equipped with less 
sophisticated antiskid systems were replaced with newer models having more efficient antiskid 
systems.  
 
Autobrake systems were introduced during the seventies. They are found on many jet transport 
aircraft today. It was estimated that autobrakes were used in 30% of all landings in the study 
period. In 2004 this share was estimated to be nearly 50% of all landings. 
 
Since the sixties research on tire braking friction is conducted. These studies provided insight 
into runway friction and how it could be improved. This has led to the introduction of for 
instance grooved and porous friction course runways. Although these surfaces often gave an 
improvement in runway friction on wet runways they do not rule out the possibility to overrun 
such a runway. Indeed there were a number of landing overrun accidents that took place on 
grooved runways. Also many studies were conducted to measure runway friction using ground 
vehicles. The objective was often to correlate the braking friction of these ground vehicles with 
those of an aircraft. Unfortunately, despite the enormous effort a lot of work is still to be done in 
this area to arrive at a useful way to correlate ground vehicles with full scale aircraft. 
 
During the late nineties different safety studies were initiated with the aim to improve the level 
of flight safety. Special attention was given to accidents that occurred during the approach and 
landing including landing overruns.  Studies include those conducted by the commercial 
aviation safety team (CAST) on approach & landing accidents, the Flight Safety Foundation 
task force on approach & landing accidents (FSF, 2001), and the joint study into landing aids 
(Khatwa, 1996). These studies provided the aviation community with a set of mitigating 
measures. Especially the FSF Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction Briefing Notes are of 
great importance. Several briefing notes are devoted to issues that affect the possibility of 
landing overruns. However, it is too early to conclude that these initiatives had a major 
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influence on the reduction of the landing overrun accident rate during the first five years of the 
twenty-first century. 
 
Another interesting technology that is worthwhile to mention here is the application of a ground 
arrestor system which is located beyond the end of the runway and centred on the extended 
runway centreline. A ground arrestor system is designed to stop an overrunning aircraft by 
exerting deceleration forces on its landing gear Although this technology (as explained later) 
cannot prevent overruns from happening its application can mean the difference between an 
accident and a minor incident. Different types of ground arrestor systems were studied in the 
UK in the seventies and later in the United States. An example of a soft ground arrestor system 
is Engineered Material Arresting Systems (EMAS). A soft ground arrestor system like EMAS 
deforms under the weight of an aircraft tire that runs over it. As the tires crush the material, the 
drag forces decelerate the aircraft, bringing it to a safe stop. In recent years EMAS became 
popular in the United States at airports that have difficulties to comply with the rules on runway 
safety areas defined by the FAA. There have been at least three reported overruns in which 
EMAS stopped the aircraft. These occurrences took place in the United States with a Saab 340 
(May 1999, see Figure 4), a MD11 (May 2003), and most recently in January 2005 with a B747. 
Clearly no soft ground arrestor system can prevent overruns. However, it seems evident that 
such a system can reduce the consequences. Other arrestor systems were also studied the past. 
Examples are loose gravel, water ponds, and arrestor cables. Application of these systems to 
commercial airports has been limited. 
 
Figure 4: Overrun with a SAAB 340 that ended in a soft arrestor bed. 
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6 Final remarks 
The variables that increase the risk of a landing overrun were discussed in the previous sections. 
Each of the investigated variables played an important role in the chain of events leading to an 
overrun. Typically a landing overrun was not characterised by the presence of only one variable. 
It is often the combination of factors that finally made the aircraft to overrun the runway. The 
quantified risk ratios in this study demonstrate that associations exist between a number of 
landing related factors and the risk of a landing overrun accident. Such associations do not 
prove any causation and only suggest that an increase in risk for a landing overrun accident 
appears when the factor is present. The present study did not try to identify the underlying 
causal factors related to landing overruns. There have been many studies conducted in the past 
in which these underlying causal factors have been identified (see e.g. FSF, 2001). 
 
On September 19, 1972 a Fokker F28 made an NDB approach to Runway 22 in conditions of 
heavy rains and poor visibility at Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The final approach to touchdown was 
steep. Finally the aircraft touched down smoothly with a speed 20 kts in excess of the 
recommended touchdown speed at 3,300ft. beyond the threshold. During flare the pilot added 
power. The remaining runway length after touchdown was some 3,700ft.. After touchdown there 
was no appreciable deceleration of the aircraft. The ground spoilers did not deploy due to the 
lack of wheel spin up. This was caused by hydroplaning of the main gear tires. The pilot did not 
select ground spoilers manually. The aircraft was not stopped on the runway and it overran 
across an area of soft ground before impacting an embankment, breaking off the left wing.  The 
aircraft eventually came to rest some 750ft beyond the end of the runway.  In the final part of 
the approach the controller informed the crew that the runway was wet. However in actual fact 
the runway was flooded. This was due to the heavy rains in combination with the fact that the 
runway contained undulations in the surface which favoured the flooding of the runway.   
Source: Accident Investigation Report published by the Dutch Civil Aviation Authorities and 
Nigerian Government, 1973. 
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the landing overrun accident data studied in this 
paper: 
 
• The Africa region demonstrated the highest landing overrun accident rate, followed by 
Central/South America, and Asia. All these regions had rates of more than 1 accident per 
million landings. The rest of the world demonstrated rates below 1 accident per two million 
landings which was less than half of the rate of the previous mentioned regions. North 
America had the lowest rate of all regions. 
 
• No statistically significant difference in the estimated landing overrun accident rate 
between commercial transport jet and turboprop aircraft was found. 
 
• On a worldwide basis, there appears to be a significant increase in landing overrun risk 
when one of the following factors is present during a landing: Non-precision approach, 
touching down far beyond the threshold (long landing), excess approach speed, visual 
approach, significant tailwind present, high on approach, wet/flooded runway, and/or 
snow/ice/slush covered runway. The highest risk increase occurred when the aircraft 
touched down far beyond the threshold (long landing), followed by excess approach speed.  
 
• On a worldwide basis, the landing overrun accident rate has reduced by a factor of three 
over a period of thirty-five years. This reduction is most likely the result of a number of 
factors including improvement in braking devices (antiskid, autobrakes etc.), better 
understanding of runway friction issues, and safety awareness campaigns.  
 
• Late or no application of available stopping devices was often found to be a factor in the 
landing overrun accident. These overrun accidents were all avoidable if the crew had used 
the available stopping devices, without any delay. 
 
7.2 Recommendations 
 
• It is recommended to disseminate the results of this study to all interested parties including 
airlines, regulators, and pilot unions. 
 
• It is recommended to analyse in detail the characteristics associated with long landings 
using recorded flight data of normal day-to-day landings. 
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